rfc8702xml2.original.xml   rfc8702.xml 
<?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?> <?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?>
<!DOCTYPE rfc SYSTEM "rfc2629.dtd" [
<!ENTITY RFC2104 SYSTEM "https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RF
C.2104.xml">
<!ENTITY RFC2119 SYSTEM "https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RF
C.2119.xml">
<!ENTITY RFC3279 SYSTEM "https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RF
C.3279.xml">
<!ENTITY RFC3370 SYSTEM "https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RF
C.3370.xml">
<!ENTITY RFC4055 SYSTEM "http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC
.4055.xml">
<!-- <!ENTITY RFC4086 SYSTEM "https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/referen
ce.RFC.4086.xml"> -->
<!ENTITY RFC5480 SYSTEM "https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RF
C.5480.xml">
<!ENTITY RFC5652 SYSTEM "https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RF
C.5652.xml">
<!ENTITY RFC5753 SYSTEM "https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RF
C.5753.xml">
<!ENTITY RFC5911 SYSTEM "https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RF
C.5911.xml">
<!ENTITY RFC6268 SYSTEM "https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RF
C.6268.xml">
<!ENTITY RFC6979 SYSTEM "http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC
.6979.xml">
<!ENTITY RFC8017 SYSTEM "https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RF
C.8017.xml">
<!ENTITY RFC8174 PUBLIC "" "http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.
RFC.8174.xml">
<!ENTITY I-D.ietf-lamps-pkix-shake SYSTEM "https://xml2rfc.tools.ietf.org/public
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<!ENTITY I-D.draft-housley-lamps-cms-sha3-hash SYSTEM "http://xml2rfc.tools.ietf
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l">
]>
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<!-- For a complete list and description of processing instructions (PIs), <rfc number="8702" xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" category="std"
please see http://xml.resource.org/authoring/README.html. --> consensus="true"
<!-- Below are generally applicable Processing Instructions (PIs) that most I-Ds docName="draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shakes-18" ipr="trust200902" updates="3370"
might want to use. obsoletes="" submissionType="IETF" xml:lang="en" tocInclude="true"
(Here they are set differently than their defaults in xml2rfc v1.32) --> symRefs="true" sortRefs="true" version="3">
<?rfc strict="yes" ?>
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<!-- control the table of contents (ToC) -->
<?rfc toc="yes"?>
<!-- generate a ToC -->
<?rfc tocdepth="4"?>
<!-- the number of levels of subsections in ToC. default: 3 -->
<!-- control references -->
<?rfc symrefs="yes"?>
<!-- use symbolic references tags, i.e, [RFC2119] instead of [1] -->
<?rfc sortrefs="yes" ?>
<!-- sort the reference entries alphabetically -->
<!-- control vertical white space
(using these PIs as follows is recommended by the RFC Editor) -->
<?rfc compact="yes" ?>
<!-- do not start each main section on a new page -->
<?rfc subcompact="no" ?>
<!-- keep one blank line between list items -->
<!-- end of list of popular I-D processing instructions -->
<rfc category="std" docName="draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shakes-18" ipr="trust200902" u
pdates="3370">
<!-- category values: std, bcp, info, exp, and historic
ipr="full3978" (probably old)
ipr values: full3667, noModification3667, noDerivatives3667
you can add the attributes updates="NNNN" and obsoletes="NNNN"
they will automatically be output with "(if approved)" -->
<!-- ***** FRONT MATTER ***** --> <!-- ***** FRONT MATTER ***** -->
<front> <front>
<title abbrev="SHAKEs in CMS">Use of the SHAKE One-way Hash <title abbrev="SHAKEs in CMS">Use of the SHAKE One-Way Hash
Functions in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)</title> Functions in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)</title>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8702" />
<author fullname="Panos Kampanakis" initials="P." surname="Kampanakis">
<organization>Cisco Systems</organization>
<address>
<email>pkampana@cisco.com</email>
</address>
</author>
<author fullname="Quynh Dang" initials="Q." surname="Dang">
<organization>NIST</organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street>100 Bureau Drive</street>
<city>Gaithersburg</city>
<region>MD</region>
<code>20899</code>
<country>United States of America</country>
</postal>
<email>quynh.Dang@nist.gov</email>
</address>
</author>
<date month="January" year="2020"/>
<area>General</area>
<workgroup>LAMPS WG</workgroup>
<author fullname="Panos Kampanakis" initials="P." surname="Kampanakis"> <!-- [rfced] *ADs, version 18 of this document was submitted after version 17
<organization>Cisco Systems</organization> was approved for publication. Please review the changes in Sections 3 and
<address><email>pkampana@cisco.com</email></address> Appendix A between these versions and let us know if you approve.
</author>
<author fullname="Quynh Dang" initials="Q." surname="Dang"> The changes can be viewed here:
<organization>NIST</organization> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shakes/history/
<address><postal><street>100 Bureau Drive</street> -->
<street>Gaithersburg, MD 20899</street>
</postal>
<email>quynh.Dang@nist.gov</email>
</address>
</author>
<date year="2019"/> <!-- [rfced] Please insert any keywords (beyond those that appear in
<area>General</area> the title) for use on https://www.rfc-editor.org/search.
<workgroup>LAMPS WG</workgroup> -->
<abstract> <keyword>example</keyword>
<t>This document updates the “Cryptographic Message Syntax Algorithms
”
(RFC3370) and describes the conventions for using the SHAKE famil
y of
hash functions in the Cryptographic Message Syntax as one-way has
h
functions with the RSA Probabilistic signature and ECDSA signature
algorithms. The conventions for the
associated signer public keys in CMS are also described. </t>
</abstract>
</front>
<middle> <!-- [rfced] Please review the type attribute of each sourcecode element in the
XML
file to ensure correctness. The current list of types is available at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/materials/sourcecode-types.txt. See Section 2.48.4
of RFC 7991 for more information.
-->
<section title="Change Log"> <!--[rfced] We see a number of author-inserted comments in the .xml file for
<t>[ EDNOTE: Remove this section before publication. ]</t> this document. We are unsure if these have been resolved. Please review and
<t><list style="symbols"> let us know if these can be deleted or if they need to be addressed.
<t>draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-18: -->
<list>
<t>Minor ASN.1 changes.</t>
</list></t>
<t>draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-17:
<list>
<t>Minor updates for EDNOTE accuracy.</t>
</list></t>
<t>draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-16:
<list>
<t>Minor nits.</t>
<t>Using bytes instead of bits for consistency.</t>
</list></t>
<t>draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-15:
<list>
<t>Minor editorial nits.</t>
</list></t>
<t>draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-14:
<list>
<t>Fixing error with incorrect preimage resistance bits for SHA
128 and SHA256.</t>
</list></t>
<t>draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-13:
<list>
<t>Addressing comments from Dan M.'s secdir review.</t>
<t>Addressing comment from Scott B.'s opsdir review about refer
ences in the abstract.</t>
</list></t>
<t>draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-12:
<list>
<t>Nits identified by Roman, Barry L. in ballot position review
.</t>
</list></t>
<t>draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-11:
<list>
<t>Minor nits.</t>
<t>Nits identified by Roman in AD Review.</t>
</list></t>
<t>draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-10:
<list>
<t>Updated IANA considerations section to request for OID assig
nments. </t>
</list></t>
<t>draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-09:
<list>
<t>Fixed minor text nit.</t>
<t>Updates in Sec Considerations section.</t>
</list></t>
<t>draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-08:
<list>
<t>id-shake128-len and id-shake256-len were replaced with id-sh
a128 with 32 bytes output length and id-shake256 with 64 bytes output length.</t
>
<t>Fixed a discrepancy between section 3 and 4.4 about the KMAC
OIDs that have parameters as optional. </t>
</list></t>
<t>draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-07:
<list>
<t>Small nit from Russ while in WGLC.</t>
</list></t>
<t>draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-06:
<list>
<t>Incorporated Eric's suggestion from WGLC.</t>
</list></t>
<t>draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-05:
<list>
<t>Added informative references.</t>
<t>Updated ASN.1 so it compiles.</t>
<t>Updated IANA considerations.</t>
</list></t>
<t>draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-04:
<list>
<t>Added RFC8174 reference and text. </t>
<t>Explicitly explained why RSASSA-PSS-params are omitted in se
ction 4.2.1.</t>
<t>Simplified Public Keys section by removing redundant info fr
om RFCs.</t>
</list></t>
<t>draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-03:
<list>
<t>Removed paragraph suggesting KMAC to be used in generating k
in Deterministic ECDSA. That should be RFC6979-bis. </t>
<t>Removed paragraph from Security Considerations that talks ab
out randomness of k because we are using deterministic ECDSA.</t>
<t>Completed ASN.1 module and fixed KMAC ASN.1 based on Jim's f
eedback.</t>
<t>Text fixes.</t>
</list></t>
<t>draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-02:
<list>
<t>Updates based on suggestions and clarifications by Jim. </t>
<t>Started ASN.1 module.</t>
</list></t>
<t>draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-01:
<list>
<t>Significant reorganization of the sections to simplify the
introduction, the new OIDs and their use in CMS.</t>
<t>Added new OIDs for RSASSA-PSS that hardcodes hash, salt an
d MGF, according the WG consensus.</t>
<t>Updated Public Key section to use the new RSASSA-PSS OIDs
and clarify the algorithm identifier usage.</t>
<t>Removed the no longer used SHAKE OIDs from section 3.1.</t
>
</list></t>
<t>draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-00:
<list>
<t>Various updates to title and section names.</t>
<t>Content changes filling in text and references.</t>
</list></t>
<t>draft-dang-lamps-cms-shakes-hash-00:
<list>
<t>Initial version</t>
</list></t>
</list></t>
</section>
<section title="Introduction" anchor="intro"> <abstract>
<t>The "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)" <xref target="RFC5652"/> is u
sed to <!-- [rfced] Should "RSA Probabilistic signature" be "RSA Probabilistic
Signature Scheme (RSASSA-PSS) signature algorithm"?
Original:
This document updates the "Cryptographic Message Syntax Algorithms"
(RFC3370) and describes the conventions for using the SHAKE family of
hash functions in the Cryptographic Message Syntax as one-way hash
functions with the RSA Probabilistic signature and ECDSA signature
algorithms.
Perhaps:
This document updates the "Cryptographic Message Syntax Algorithms"
(RFC 3370) and describes the conventions for using the SHAKE family of
hash functions in the Cryptographic Message Syntax as one-way hash
functions with the RSA Probabilistic Signature Scheme (RSASSA-PSS)
signature algorithm and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
(ECDSA).
-->
<t>This document updates "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) Algorithms"
(RFC 3370) and describes the conventions for using the SHAKE family of
hash functions in the Cryptographic Message Syntax as one-way hash
functions with the RSA Probabilistic signature and Elliptic
Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) signature algorithms.
The conventions for the associated signer public keys in CMS
are also described. </t>
</abstract>
</front>
<middle>
<section anchor="intro" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>Introduction</name>
<t>"Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)" <xref target="RFC5652"
format="default"/> describes syntax used to
digitally sign, digest, authenticate, or encrypt arbitrary message conten ts. digitally sign, digest, authenticate, or encrypt arbitrary message conten ts.
"Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) Algorithms" <xref target="RFC3370"/> "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) Algorithms" <xref target="RFC3370" fo rmat="default"/>
defines the use of common cryptographic algorithms with CMS. This defines the use of common cryptographic algorithms with CMS. This
specification updates RFC3370 and describes the use of the SHAKE128 and S specification updates RFC 3370 and describes the use of the SHAKE128 and
HAKE256 SHAKE256
specified in <xref target="SHA3"/> as new hash functions in CMS. In addition specified in <xref target="SHA3" format="default"/> as new hash functions in
, CMS. In addition,
it describes the use of these functions with the RSASSA-PSS signature it describes the use of these functions with the RSA Probabilistic
algorithm <xref target="RFC8017"/> and the Elliptic Curve Digital Signatu Signature Scheme (RSASSA-PSS) signature
re algorithm <xref target="RFC8017" format="default"/> and the Elliptic Curv
Algorithm (ECDSA) <xref target="X9.62"/> with the CMS signed-data content e Digital Signature
type.</t> Algorithm (ECDSA) <xref target="X9.62" format="default"/> with the CMS si
gned-data content type.</t>
<t>In the SHA-3 family, two extendable-output functions (SHAKEs), SHAKE128 a <t>In the SHA-3 family, two extendable-output functions (SHAKEs), SHAKE128
nd SHAKE256, and SHAKE256,
are defined. Four other hash function instances, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, are defined. Four other hash function instances (SHA3-224, SHA3-256,
SHA3-384, and SHA3-512, are also defined but are out of scope for this do SHA3-384, and SHA3-512) are also defined but are out of scope for this do
cument. cument.
A SHAKE is a variable length hash function defined as SHAKE(M, d) where t A SHAKE is a variable-length hash function defined as SHAKE(M, d) where t
he he
output is a d-bits-long digest of message M. The corresponding collision output is a d-bit-long digest of message M. The corresponding collision a
and second-preimage-resistance strengths for SHAKE128 are min(d/2,128) and min( nd second-preimage-resistance strengths for SHAKE128 are min(d/2,128) and min(d,
d,128) bits, 128) bits,
respectively (Appendix A.1 <xref target="SHA3"/>). And the respectively (see Appendix A.1 of <xref target="SHA3" format="default"/>)
. And the
corresponding collision and second-preimage-resistance corresponding collision and second-preimage-resistance
strengths for SHAKE256 are min(d/2,256) and min(d,256) bits, respectively . strengths for SHAKE256 are min(d/2,256) and min(d,256) bits, respectively .
In this specification we use d=256 (for SHAKE128) and d=512 (for SHAKE256 In this specification, we use d=256 (for SHAKE128) and d=512 (for SHAKE25
).</t> 6).</t>
<t>A SHAKE can be used in CMS as the message digest function (to hash the
<t>A SHAKE can be used in CMS as the message digest function (to hash the message to be signed) in RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA, as the message
message to be signed) in RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA, message authentication code, and as the mask generation function (MGF) in RSASSA-PSS
authentication code and as the mask generation function (MGF) in RSASSA-PSS. .
This specification describes the identifiers for SHAKEs to be used in This specification describes the identifiers for SHAKEs to be used in
CMS and their meaning. </t> CMS and their meanings. </t>
<!--
<!-- <section title="ASN.1" anchor="section-1.1">
<t>CMS values are generated using ASN.1 <xref target="ASN1-B"/>, using the Basic <t>CMS values are generated using ASN.1 <xref target="ASN1-B"/>, using the Basic
Encoding Rules (BER) and the Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) Encoding Rules (BER) and the Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)
<xref target="ASN1-E"/>.</t> <xref target="ASN1-E"/>.</t>
</section> --> </section> -->
<section anchor="terminology" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>Terminology</name>
<section anchor="terminology" title="Terminology"> <t>
<t>The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQU
NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", IRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
"MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>
described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t> "<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to
</section> <!-- Terminology --> be interpreted as
</section> described in BCP&nbsp;14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/>
when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.
</t>
<section title="Identifiers" anchor="oids"> </section>
<!-- <figure><artwork><![CDATA[ <!-- Terminology -->
</section>
<section anchor="oids" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>Identifiers</name>
<!-- <figure><artwork><![CDATA[
id-RSASSA-PSS OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 10 } id-RSASSA-PSS OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 10 }
RSASSA-PSS-params ::= SEQUENCE { RSASSA-PSS-params ::= SEQUENCE {
hashAlgorithm HashAlgorithm, hashAlgorithm HashAlgorithm,
maskGenAlgorithm MaskGenAlgorithm, maskGenAlgorithm MaskGenAlgorithm,
saltLength INTEGER, saltLength INTEGER,
trailerField INTEGER } trailerField INTEGER }
]]></artwork></figure> --> ]]></artwork></figure> -->
<!-- Commention out the below OIDs as they are no longer pertinent for the
<!-- Commention out the below OIDs as they are no longer pertinent for below public keys and sigs -->
the below public keys and sigs --> <!-- The mask generation function used in RSASSA-PSS
<!-- The mask generation function used in RSASSA-PSS
is defined in <xref target="RFC8017"/>, but we include it here as well is defined in <xref target="RFC8017"/>, but we include it here as well
for convenience: for convenience:
<t><figure><artwork><![CDATA[ <t><figure><artwork><![CDATA[
id-mgf1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 8 }]]></artwork></figure></t> id-mgf1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 8 }]]></artwork></figure></t>
<t>The parameters field associated with id-mgf1 MUST have a <t>The parameters field associated with id-mgf1 <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> have a
hashAlgorithm value that identifies the hash used with MGF1. To use hashAlgorithm value that identifies the hash used with MGF1. To use
SHAKE as this hash, this parameter MUST be id-shake128-len or id- SHAKE as this hash, this parameter <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be id-shake128-len o r id-
shake256-len as specified in <xref target="mdmgf" /> above. </t> --> shake256-len as specified in <xref target="mdmgf" /> above. </t> -->
<t>This section identifies eight new object identifiers (OIDs)
<t>This section identifies eight new object identifiers (OIDs)
for using SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 in CMS.</t> for using SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 in CMS.</t>
<t>Two object identifiers for SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 hash functions are def
<t>Two object identifiers for SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 hash functions are d ined
efined in <xref target="shake-nist-oids" format="default"/>, and we include the
in <xref target="shake-nist-oids"/> and we include them here for conveni m here for convenience.</t>
ence.</t> <sourcecode type="asn.1"><![CDATA[
<t><figure><artwork><![CDATA[
id-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) id-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
nistAlgorithm(4) 2 11 } nistAlgorithm(4) 2 11 }
id-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) id-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
nistAlgorithm(4) 2 12 } nistAlgorithm(4) 2 12 }
]]></artwork></figure></t> ]]></sourcecode>
<t>In this specification, when using the id-shake128 or id-shake256 algori
<t>In this specification, when using the id-shake128 or id-shake256 algorit thm identifiers, the parameters <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be absent. That is, the iden
hm identifiers, the parameters MUST be absent. That is, the identifier SHALL be tifier <bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> be a SEQUENCE of one component, the OID.
a SEQUENCE of one component, the OID. <!-- present, and they <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> employ the ShakeOutputLen --
<!-- present, and they MUST employ the ShakeOutputLen --> >
<!-- "MUST employ syntax borrowed from RFC4055 --> <!-- "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> employ syntax borrowed from RFC4055 -->
<!-- syntax that contains an encoded positive integer value of 32 or 64 <!-- syntax that contains an encoded positive integer value of 32 or 64
respectively.--></t> respectively.-->
</t>
<t><xref target="I-D.ietf-lamps-pkix-shake"/> <t><xref target="I-D.ietf-lamps-pkix-shake" format="default"/>
[ EDNOTE: Update reference with the RFC when it is published. ] defines two identifiers for RSASSA-PSS signatures using SHAKEs, which we
defines two identifiers for RSASSA-PSS signatures using SHAKEs which we include here for
include here for
convenience. convenience.
</t> </t>
<t><figure><artwork><![CDATA[ <sourcecode type="asn.1"><![CDATA[
id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) 30 } security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) 30 }
id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) 31 } security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) 31 }
]]></artwork></figure></t> ]]></sourcecode>
<t>The same RSASSA-PSS algorithm identifiers can be used for identifying
<t>The same RSASSA-PSS algorithm identifiers can be used for identifying
public keys and signatures.</t> public keys and signatures.</t>
<t><xref target="I-D.ietf-lamps-pkix-shake" format="default"/>
<t><xref target="I-D.ietf-lamps-pkix-shake"/>
[ EDNOTE: Update reference with the RFC when it is published. ]
also defines two algorithm also defines two algorithm
identifiers of ECDSA signatures using SHAKEs which we include here for identifiers of ECDSA signatures using SHAKEs, which we include here for
convenience. convenience.
</t> </t>
<t><figure><artwork><![CDATA[ <sourcecode type="asn.1"><![CDATA[
id-ecdsa-with-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) id-ecdsa-with-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) 32 } security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) 32 }
id-ecdsa-with-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) id-ecdsa-with-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) 33 } security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) 33 }
]]></artwork></figure></t> ]]></sourcecode>
<t>The parameters for the four RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA identifiers
<t>The parameters for the four RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA identifiers <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be absent. That is, each identifier <bcp14>SHALL</bc
MUST be absent. That is, each identifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one comp p14> be a SEQUENCE of one component,
onent,
the OID.</t> the OID.</t>
<!-- <figure><artwork><![CDATA[
<!-- <figure><artwork><![CDATA[
sigAlgs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) sigAlgs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 3 } us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 3 }
id-ecdsa-with-shake128 ::= { sigAlgs x } id-ecdsa-with-shake128 ::= { sigAlgs x }
id-ecdsa-with-shake256 ::= { sigAlgs y } id-ecdsa-with-shake256 ::= { sigAlgs y }
Note: x and y will be specified by NIST. Note: x and y will be specified by NIST.
]]></artwork> </figure> --> ]]></artwork> </figure> -->
<t>
<t>Two object identifiers for KMACs using SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 as In <xref target="shake-nist-oids" format="default"/>, the National
defined in by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) defines two object
in <xref target="shake-nist-oids"/> identifiers for Keccak message authentication codes(KMACs) using SHAKE12
8 and SHAKE256,
and we include them here for convenience.</t> and we include them here for convenience.</t>
<t><figure><artwork><![CDATA[ <sourcecode type="asn.1"><![CDATA[
id-KmacWithSHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) id-KmacWithSHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
nistAlgorithm(4) 2 19 } nistAlgorithm(4) 2 19 }
id-KmacWithSHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) id-KmacWithSHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
nistAlgorithm(4) 2 20 } nistAlgorithm(4) 2 20 }
]]></artwork></figure></t> ]]></sourcecode>
<t>The parameters for id-KmacWithSHAKE128 and id-KmacWithSHAKE256 are <bcp
<t>The parameters for id-KmacWithSHAKE128 and id-KmacWithSHAKE256 are OP 14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>.</t>
TIONAL.</t> <!-- <figure><artwork><![CDATA[
<!-- <figure><artwork><![CDATA[
hashAlgs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) hashAlgs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 2 } us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 2 }
id-KmacWithSHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { x } id-KmacWithSHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { x }
id-KmacWithSHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { y } id-KmacWithSHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { y }
Note: x and y will be specified by NIST. Note: x and y will be specified by NIST.
]]></artwork></figure> --> ]]></artwork></figure> -->
<t>Sections <xref target="md" format="counter"/>, <xref
<t><xref target="md"/>, <xref target="rsa-sigs"/>, <xref target="ecdsa-sigs target="rsa-sigs" format="counter"/>, <xref target="ecdsa-sigs"
"/> format="counter"/>, and <xref target="kmac" format="counter"/> specify
and <xref target="kmac"/> specify the required output length for each us the required output length for each use of SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 in
e message digests, RSASSA-PSS, ECDSA, and KMAC.</t>
of SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 in message digests, RSASSA-PSS, ECDSA </section>
and KMAC.</t> <section numbered="true" toc="default">
</section> <name>Use in CMS</name>
<section anchor="md" numbered="true" toc="default">
<section title="Use in CMS"> <name>Message Digests</name>
<section anchor="md" title="Message Digests"> <t>The id-shake128 and id-shake256 OIDs (see <xref target="oids" format=
<t>The id-shake128 and id-shake256 OIDs (<xref target="oids"/>) can "default"/>) can
be used as the digest algorithm identifiers located in the Signed Data, be used as the digest algorithm identifiers located in the Signed Data,
SignerInfo, DigestedData, and the AuthenticatedData digestAlgori thm fields SignerInfo, DigestedData, and the AuthenticatedData digestAlgori thm fields
in CMS <xref target="RFC5652"/>. The OID encoding MUST omit the p in CMS <xref target="RFC5652" format="default"/>. The OID encodin
arameters field and the output length of SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 as the message dig g <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> omit the parameters field and the output length of SHAKE12
est MUST be 32 or 64 bytes, respectively.</t> 8 or SHAKE256 as the message digest <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be 32 or 64 bytes, respe
ctively.</t>
<t>The digest values are located in the DigestedData field and the Me <t>The digest values are located in the DigestedData field and the Messa
ssage ge
Digest authenticated attribute included in the signedAttributes of th e Digest authenticated attribute included in the signedAttributes of th e
SignedData signerInfo. In addition, digest values are input to SignedData SignerInfo. In addition, digest values are input to
signature algorithms. The digest algorithm MUST be the same as the signature algorithms. The digest algorithm <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be the
same as the
message hash algorithms used in signatures.</t> message hash algorithms used in signatures.</t>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="sigs" numbered="true" toc="default">
<section title="Signatures" anchor="sigs"> <name>Signatures</name>
<t>In CMS, signature algorithm identifiers are located in the SignerInfo <t>In CMS, signature algorithm identifiers are located in the SignerInfo
signatureAlgorithm field of SignedData content type and countersignature attribute. signatureAlgorithm field of SignedData content type and countersignature attribute.
Signature values are located in the SignerInfo signature field of Signature values are located in the SignerInfo signature field of
SignedData content type and countersignature attribute.</t> SignedData content type and countersignature attribute.</t>
<t>Conforming implementations that process RSASSA-PSS and
<t>Conforming implementations that process RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA with SHAKE signatures when processing CMS data <bcp14>MUST<
ECDSA with SHAKE signatures when processing CMS data MUST recogni /bcp14> recognize the
ze the corresponding OIDs specified in <xref target="oids" format="defau
corresponding OIDs specified in <xref target="oids"/>.</t> lt"/>.</t>
<t>When using RSASSA-PSS or ECDSA with SHAKEs, the RSA modulus or ECDSA
<t>When using RSASSA-PSS or ECDSA with SHAKEs, the RSA modulus or ECD curve order <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be chosen in line with the SHAK
SA E output length. Refer to <xref target="sec_cons" format="default"/> for more de
curve order SHOULD be chosen in line with the SHAKE output length tails.</t>
. Refer to <xref target="sec_cons"/> for more details.</t> <section anchor="rsa-sigs" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>RSASSA-PSS Signatures</name>
<section title="RSASSA-PSS Signatures" anchor="rsa-sigs"> <t>The RSASSA-PSS algorithm is defined in <xref target="RFC8017" forma
<t>The RSASSA-PSS algorithm is defined in <xref target="RFC8017"/>. t="default"/>.
When id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 specified When id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 (specifie
in <xref target="oids"/> d in <xref target="oids" format="default"/>)
is used, the encoding MUST omit the parameters field. That is, is used, the encoding <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> omit the parameters f
the AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, ield. That is,
id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256. <xref target= the AlgorithmIdentifier <bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> be a SEQUENCE of o
"RFC4055"/> ne component:
id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256. <xref target=
"RFC4055" format="default"/>
defines RSASSA-PSS-params that are used to define the algorithm s and inputs defines RSASSA-PSS-params that are used to define the algorithm s and inputs
to the algorithm. This specification does not use parameters be to the algorithm.
cause the This specification does not use parameters because the
hash, mask generation algorithm, trailer and salt are embedded hash, mask generation algorithm, trailer, and salt are embedded
in in
the OID definition.</t> the OID definition.</t>
<t>The hash algorithm used to hash a message being signed and the hash
<t>The hash algorithm to hash a message being signed and the ha algorithm as the mask generation function used in RSASSA-PSS <bcp14>MU
sh ST</bcp14> be
algorithm as the mask generation function used in RSASSA-PSS MUST be
the same: both SHAKE128 or both SHAKE256. The output length of the same: both SHAKE128 or both SHAKE256. The output length of
the hash algorithm which hashes the message SHALL be 32 (for SHAKE128) the hash algorithm that hashes the message <bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> be 32 (for SHAKE128)
or 64 bytes (for SHAKE256). </t> or 64 bytes (for SHAKE256). </t>
<t>The mask generation function takes an octet string of variable
length and a desired output length as input, and outputs an octet
string of the desired length. In RSASSA-PSS with SHAKEs, the SHAKEs
<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be used natively as the MGF, instead of the MGF1
algorithm that uses the hash function in multiple iterations, as
specified in <xref target="RFC8017" sectionFormat="of"
section="B.2.1"/>. In other words, the MGF is defined as the
SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 with input being the mgfSeed for
id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 and id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256,
respectively.
<!--[rfced] This sentence is a bit difficult to follow. How
may we rephrase?
<t>The mask generation function takes an octet string of variable l Original:
ength The mgfSeed is the seed from
and a desired output length as input, and outputs an octet string of which mask is generated, an octet string [RFC8017].
the desired length. In RSASSA-PSS with SHAKEs, the SHAKEs MUST be -->
used natively as the MGF function, instead of the MGF1 algorithm that The mgfSeed is
uses the hash function in multiple iterations as specified in the seed from which mask is generated, an octet string <xref
Section B.2.1 of [RFC8017]. In other words, the MGF is defined as target="RFC8017" format="default"/>. As explained in Step 9 of
the SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 with input being the mgfSeed for id-RSASSA-PS <xref target="RFC8017" sectionFormat="of" section="9.1.1"/>, the
S- output length of the MGF is emLen - hLen - 1 bytes. emLen is the
SHAKE128 and id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256, respectively. The mgfSeed is the maximum message length ceil((n-1)/8), where n is the RSA modulus in
seed bits. hLen is 32 and 64 bytes for id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 and
from which mask is generated, an octet string <xref target="RFC id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256, respectively. Thus, when SHAKE is used as
8017"/>. the MGF, the SHAKE output length maskLen is (8*emLen - 264) or
As explained in Step 9 of section 9.1.1 of <xref target="RFC801 (8*emLen - 520) bits, respectively. For example, when RSA modulus n
7"/>, the output is 2048, the output length of SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 as the MGF will
length of the MGF is emLen - hLen - 1 bytes. emLen is the maxim be 1784 or 1528 bits when id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 or
um message id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 is used, respectively.</t>
length ceil((n-1)/8), where n is the RSA modulus in bits. hLen <t>The RSASSA-PSS saltLength <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be 32 bytes for id-RS
is 32 and ASSA-PSS-SHAKE128
64-bytes for id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 and id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256,
respectively.
Thus when SHAKE is used as the MGF, the SHAKE output length mas
kLen is
(8*emLen - 264) or (8*emLen - 520) bits, respectively. For exam
ple, when RSA modulus n is 2048,
the output length of SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 as the MGF will be 17
84 or 1528-bits
when id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 is used,
respectively.</t>
<t>The RSASSA-PSS saltLength MUST be 32 bytes for id-RSASSA-PSS
-SHAKE128
or 64 bytes for id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256. or 64 bytes for id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256.
Finally, the trailerField MUST be 1, which represents the trailer Finally, the trailerField <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be 1, which represents t
field with hexadecimal value 0xBC <xref target="RFC8017"/>.</t> he trailer
</section> field with hexadecimal value 0xBC <xref target="RFC8017" format="defau
lt"/>.</t>
<section title="ECDSA Signatures" anchor="ecdsa-sigs"> </section>
<t>The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is define <section anchor="ecdsa-sigs" numbered="true" toc="default">
d in <name>ECDSA Signatures</name>
<xref target="X9.62"/>. When the id-ecdsa-with-shake128 or id-ecdsa <t>The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is defined i
-with-shake256 n
(specified in <xref target="oids"/>) algorithm identifier appea <xref target="X9.62" format="default"/>. When the id-ecdsa-with-sha
rs, the ke128 or id-ecdsa-with-shake256
(specified in <xref target="oids" format="default"/>) algorithm
identifier appears, the
respective SHAKE function is used as the hash. respective SHAKE function is used as the hash.
The encoding MUST omit the parameters field. That is, the Algor The encoding <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> omit the parameters field. Tha
ithmIdentifier t is, the AlgorithmIdentifier
SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, the OID id-ecdsa-with-sha <bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> be a SEQUENCE of one component, the OID id
ke128 or -ecdsa-with-shake128 or
id-ecdsa-with-shake256.</t> id-ecdsa-with-shake256.</t>
<!--[rfced] For the ease of the reader, it may be helpful to add a
citation to this sentence:
<t>For simplicity and compliance with the ECDSA standard specif Original:
ication, For simplicity and compliance with the ECDSA standard specification,
the output length of the hash function must be explicitly determined.
-->
<t>For simplicity and compliance with the ECDSA standard specification
,
the output length of the hash function must be explicitly deter mined. the output length of the hash function must be explicitly deter mined.
The output length for SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 used in ECDSA MUST b e 32 The output length for SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 used in ECDSA <bcp14 >MUST</bcp14> be 32
or 64 bytes, respectively. </t> or 64 bytes, respectively. </t>
<t>Conforming Certification Authority (CA) implementations that genera
<t>Conforming CA implementations that generate ECDSA with SHAKE te ECDSA with SHAKE signatures
signatures in certificates or Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) <bcp14>S
in certificates or CRLs SHOULD generate such signatures with a HOULD</bcp14> generate such signatures with a
deterministically generated, non-random k in accordance with al deterministically generated, nonrandom k in accordance with all
l the requirements specified in <xref target="RFC6979" format="de
the requirements specified in <xref target="RFC6979"/>. fault"/>.
<!-- Sections 7.2 and 7.3 of <!-- Sections 7.2 and 7.3 of
<xref target="X9.62"/> or with all the requirements specified i n Section <xref target="X9.62"/> or with all the requirements specified i n Section
4.1.3 of <xref target="SEC1"/>. --> 4.1.3 of <xref target="SEC1"/>. -->
They MAY also generate such signatures They <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> also generate such signatures
in accordance with all other recommendations in <xref target="X in accordance with all other recommendations in <xref target="X
9.62"/> or 9.62" format="default"/> or
<xref target="SEC1"/> if they have a stated policy that require <xref target="SEC1" format="default"/> if they have a stated po
s licy that requires
conformance to those standards. Those standards have not specif ied conformance to those standards. Those standards have not specif ied
SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 as hash algorithm options. However, SHAKE 128 and SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 as hash algorithm options. However, SHAKE 128 and
SHAKE256 with output length being 32 and 64 octets, respectivel SHAKE256 with output length being 32 and 64 octets, respectivel
y can y, can
be used instead of 256 and 512-bit output hash algorithms such be used instead of 256 and 512-bit output hash algorithms, such
as SHA256 as SHA256
and SHA512.</t> and SHA512.</t>
<!-- <t>In Section 3.2 "Generation of k" of <xref target="RFC6979"/>,
<!-- <t>In Section 3.2 "Generation of k" of <xref target="RFC69 HMAC is used to derive
79"/>, HMAC is used to derive
the deterministic k. Conforming implementations that generate d eterministic the deterministic k. Conforming implementations that generate d eterministic
ECDSA with SHAKE signatures in X.509 MUST use KMAC with SHAKE12 8 or KMAC with ECDSA with SHAKE signatures in X.509 <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> use KM AC with SHAKE128 or KMAC with
SHAKE256 as specfied in <xref target="SP800-185"/> when SHAKE12 8 or SHAKE256 is SHAKE256 as specfied in <xref target="SP800-185"/> when SHAKE12 8 or SHAKE256 is
used as the message hashing algorithm, respectively. In this si tuation, KMAC with used as the message hashing algorithm, respectively. In this si tuation, KMAC with
SHAKE128 and KMAC with SHAKE256 have 256-bit and 512-bit output s respectively, SHAKE128 and KMAC with SHAKE256 have 256-bit and 512-bit output s respectively,
and the optional customization bit string S is an empty string. </t> --> and the optional customization bit string S is an empty string. </t> -->
</section> </section>
</section> </section>
<section numbered="true" toc="default">
<section title="Public Keys"> <name>Public Keys</name>
<t>In CMS, the signer's public key algorithm identifiers are located <t>In CMS, the signer's public key algorithm identifiers are located in
in the the
OriginatorPublicKey's algorithm attribute. OriginatorPublicKey's algorithm attribute.
The conventions and encoding for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA <!-- and Ed DSA --> The conventions and encoding for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA <!-- and Ed DSA -->
public keys algorithm identifiers are as specified in public keys algorithm identifiers are as specified in
Section 2.3 of <xref target="RFC3279"/>, <xref target="RFC3279" sectionFormat="of" section="2.3"/>,
Section 3.1 of <xref target="RFC4055"/> <xref target="RFC4055" sectionFormat="of" section="3.1"/>,
and Section 2.1 of <xref target="RFC5480"/>. and <xref target="RFC5480" sectionFormat="of" section="2.1"/>.
<!-- and <xref target="I-D.josefsson-pkix-eddsa"/> --></t> <!-- and <xref target="I-D.josefsson-pkix-eddsa"/> -->
</t>
<t>Traditionally, the rsaEncryption object identifier is used to <t>Traditionally, the rsaEncryption object identifier is used to
identify RSA public keys. The rsaEncryption object identifier identify RSA public keys. The rsaEncryption object identifier
continues to identify the public key when the RSA private continues to identify the public key when the RSA private
key owner does not wish to limit the use of the public key key owner does not wish to limit the use of the public key
exclusively to RSASSA-PSS with SHAKEs. When the RSA private key exclusively to RSASSA-PSS with SHAKEs. When the RSA private key
owner wishes to limit the use of the public key exclusively owner wishes to limit the use of the public key exclusively
to RSASSA-PSS, the AlgorithmIdentifier for RSASSA-PSS defined to RSASSA-PSS, the AlgorithmIdentifier for RSASSA-PSS defined
in <xref target="oids"/> SHOULD be used as the algorithm attribut e in <xref target="oids" format="default"/> <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> b e used as the algorithm attribute
in the OriginatorPublicKey sequence. Conforming client in the OriginatorPublicKey sequence. Conforming client
implementations that process RSASSA-PSS with SHAKE public keys implementations that process RSASSA-PSS with SHAKE public keys
in CMS message MUST recognize the corresponding OIDs in <xref tar in CMS message <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> recognize the corresponding OI
get="oids"/>.</t> Ds in <xref target="oids" format="default"/>.</t>
<t>Conforming implementations <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> specify and process th
<t>Conforming implementations MUST specify and process the e
algorithms explicitly by using the OIDs specified in algorithms explicitly by using the OIDs specified in
<xref target="oids"/> when encoding ECDSA with SHAKE <xref target="oids" format="default"/> when encoding ECDSA with S HAKE
public keys in CMS messages. </t> public keys in CMS messages. </t>
<t>The identifier parameters, as explained in <xref target="oids" format
<t>The identifier parameters, as explained in <xref target="oids" ="default"/>,
/>, <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be absent. </t>
MUST be absent. </t> </section>
</section> <section anchor="kmac" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>Message Authentication Codes</name>
<section anchor="kmac" title="Message Authentication Codes"> <t>Keccak message authentication code (KMAC) is specified in <xref targe
<t>KMAC message authentication code (KMAC) is specified in <xref targ t="SP800-185" format="default"/>.
et="SP800-185"/>.
In CMS, KMAC algorithm identifiers are located in the AuthenticatedDa ta In CMS, KMAC algorithm identifiers are located in the AuthenticatedDa ta
macAlgorithm field. The KMAC values are located in the AuthenticatedD ata mac field.</t> macAlgorithm field. The KMAC values are located in the AuthenticatedD ata mac field.</t>
<t>When the id-KmacWithSHAKE128 or id-KmacWithSHAKE256 OID
<t>When the id-KmacWithSHAKE128 or id-KmacWithSHAKE256 OID
is used as the MAC algorithm identifier, the parameters field is opti onal is used as the MAC algorithm identifier, the parameters field is opti onal
(absent or present). If absent, the SHAKE256 output length used in KM AC is (absent or present). If absent, the SHAKE256 output length used in KM AC is
32 or 64 bytes, respectively, and the customization string is an empt y string by default.</t> 32 or 64 bytes, respectively, and the customization string is an empt y string by default.</t>
<t>Conforming implementations that process KMACs with the SHAKEs
<t>Conforming implementations that process KMACs with the SHAKEs when processing CMS data <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> recognize these iden
when processing CMS data MUST recognize these identifiers.</t> tifiers.</t>
<t>When calculating the KMAC output, the variable N is 0xD2B282C2, S
<t>When calculating the KMAC output, the variable N is 0xD2B282C2, S is an empty string, and L (the integer representing the requested out
is an empty string, and L, the integer representing the requested out put
put length in bits) is 256 or 512 for KmacWithSHAKE128 or KmacWithSHAKE25
length in bits, is 256 or 512 for KmacWithSHAKE128 or KmacWithSHAKE25 6,
6,
respectively, in this specification.</t> respectively, in this specification.</t>
</section> </section>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="IANA" numbered="true" toc="default">
<section anchor="IANA" title="IANA Considerations"> <name>IANA Considerations</name>
<t>One object identifier for the ASN.1 module in <xref target="section- <t>One object identifier for the ASN.1 module in <xref target="asn-app" fo
a"/> rmat="default"/>
was requested for the SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifiers was updated in the &quot;Structure of Management Information (SMI) Secu
(1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0) registry: </t> rity for S/MIME Module Identifier
<texttable> (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0)&quot; registry: </t>
<ttcol align='center'>Decimal</ttcol> <table align="left">
<ttcol align='center'>Description</ttcol> <thead>
<ttcol align='center'>References</ttcol> <tr>
<c>70</c> <th align="center">Decimal</th>
<c>CMSAlgsForSHAKE-2019</c> <th align="center">Description</th>
<c>[EDNOTE: THIS RFC]</c> <th align="center">References</th>
</texttable> </tr>
</thead>
<!-- <t>EDNOTE: If the PKIX draft is standardized first maybe we should <tbody>
not <tr>
<td align="center">70</td>
<td align="center">CMSAlgsForSHAKE-2019</td>
<td align="center">RFC 8702</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<!-- <t>EDNOTE: If the PKIX draft is standardized first maybe we should no
t
keep these OIDS as they are not new. </t> keep these OIDS as they are not new. </t>
<t>IANA has assigned four OID identifiers in the <t>IANA has assigned four OID identifiers in the
SMI Security for PKIX Algorithms <xref target="SMI-PKIX"/> SMI Security for PKIX Algorithms <xref target="SMI-PKIX"/>
(1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6) registry </t> (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6) registry </t>
<t><figure><artwork><![CDATA[ <t><figure><artwork><![CDATA[
id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)
skipping to change at line 555 skipping to change at line 469
31 } 31 }
id-ecdsa-with-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) id-ecdsa-with-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)
32 } 32 }
id-ecdsa-with-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) id-ecdsa-with-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)
33 } 33 }
]]></artwork></figure></t> --> ]]></artwork></figure></t> -->
</section> </section>
<section anchor="sec_cons" numbered="true" toc="default">
<section title="Security Considerations" anchor="sec_cons"> <name>Security Considerations</name>
<t>This document updates <xref target="RFC3370" format="default"/>. The se
<t>This document updates <xref target="RFC3370"/>. The security conside curity considerations
rations
section of that document applies to this specification as well.</t> section of that document applies to this specification as well.</t>
<!-- <t>The SHAKEs are deterministic functions. Like any other determinist ic <!-- <t>The SHAKEs are deterministic functions. Like any other determinist ic
function, executing each function with the same input multiple times function, executing each function with the same input multiple times
will produce the same output. Therefore, users should not expect will produce the same output. Therefore, users should not expect
unrelated outputs (with the same or different output lengths) from unrelated outputs (with the same or different output lengths) from
excuting a SHAKE function with the same input multiple times. excuting a SHAKE function with the same input multiple times.
The shorter one of any 2 outputs produced from a SHAKE with the same The shorter one of any 2 outputs produced from a SHAKE with the same
input is a prefix of the longer one. It is a similar situation as input is a prefix of the longer one. It is a similar situation as
truncating a 512-bit output of SHA-512 by taking its 256 left-most bits . truncating a 512-bit output of SHA-512 by taking its 256 left-most bits .
These 256 left-most bits are a prefix of the 512-bit output.</t> --> These 256 left-most bits are a prefix of the 512-bit output.</t> -->
<!-- <t>Implementations must protect the signer's private key. Compromise
<!-- <t>Implementations must protect the signer's private key. Compromi of
se of
the signer's private key permits masquerade.</t> --> the signer's private key permits masquerade.</t> -->
<t>NIST has defined appropriate use of the hash functions in terms of the
<t>NIST has defined appropriate use of the hash functions in terms of t algorithm
he algorithm
strengths and expected time frames for secure use in Special Publications (SPs) strengths and expected time frames for secure use in Special Publications (SPs)
<xref target="SP800-78-4"/> and <xref target="SP800-107"/>. <xref target="SP800-78-4" format="default"/> and <xref target="SP800-107" format="default"/>.
These documents can be used as guides to choose appropriate key sizes These documents can be used as guides to choose appropriate key sizes
for various security scenarios. </t> for various security scenarios. </t>
<t>SHAKE128 with an output length of 32 bytes offers 128 bits of collision
<t>SHAKE128 with output length of 32 bytes offers 128-bits of collision and preimage resistance. Thus, SHAKE128 OIDs in this specification are
and preimage resistance. Thus, SHAKE128 OIDs in this specification are RECOMMEN <bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> with a 2048- (112-bit security) or 3072-bit
DED with 2048 (112-bit security) or 3072-bit (128-bit security) RSA modulus or c (128-bit security) RSA modulus or curves with a group order of 256 bits
urves with group order of 256-bits (128-bit security). SHAKE256 with 64 bytes ou (128-bit security). SHAKE256 with a 64-byte output length offers 256 bits
tput length offers 256-bits of collision and preimage resistance. Thus, the SHAK of collision and preimage resistance. Thus, the SHAKE256 OIDs in this
E256 OIDs in this specification are RECOMMENDED with 4096-bit RSA modulus or hig specification are <bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> with 4096-bit RSA modulus
her or curves with group order of at least 512 bits such as NIST Curve P-521 (25 or higher or curves with group order of at least 512 bits, such as NIST
6-bit security). Note that we recommended 4096-bit RSA because we would need 153 curve P-521 (256-bit security). Note that we recommended a 4096-bit RSA
60-bit modulus for 256-bits of security which is impractical for today's technol because we would need a 15360-bit modulus for 256 bits of security, which
ogy.</t> is impractical for today's technology.</t>
<t>When more than two parties share the same message-authentication key,
<t>When more than two parties share the same message-authentication key
,
data origin authentication is not provided. Any party that knows the data origin authentication is not provided. Any party that knows the
message-authentication key can compute a valid MAC, therefore the message-authentication key can compute a valid MAC; therefore, the
content could originate from any one of the parties.</t> content could originate from any one of the parties.</t>
<!-- <t>Implementations must randomly generate message-authentication keys
<!-- <t>Implementations must randomly generate message-authentication k
eys
and one-time values, such as the k value when generating a ECDSA and one-time values, such as the k value when generating a ECDSA
signature. In addition, the generation of public/private key pairs signature. In addition, the generation of public/private key pairs
relies on random numbers. The use of inadequate pseudo-random relies on random numbers. The use of inadequate pseudo-random
number generators (PRNGs) to generate such cryptographic values can number generators (PRNGs) to generate such cryptographic values can
result in little or no security. The generation of quality random result in little or no security. The generation of quality random
numbers is difficult. <xref target="RFC4086"/> offers important guidance numbers is difficult. <xref target="RFC4086"/> offers important guidance
in this area, and <xref target="SP800-90A"/> series provide acceptable in this area, and <xref target="SP800-90A"/> series provide acceptable
PRNGs.</t> --> PRNGs.</t> -->
<!--<t>Implementers should be aware that cryptographic algorithms may
<!--<t>Implementers should be aware that cryptographic algorithms may
become weaker with time. As new cryptanalysis techniques are developed become weaker with time. As new cryptanalysis techniques are developed
and computing power increases, the work factor or time required to brea k and computing power increases, the work factor or time required to brea k
a particular cryptographic algorithm may decrease. Therefore, cryptogra phic a particular cryptographic algorithm may decrease. Therefore, cryptogra phic
algorithm implementations should be modular allowing new algorithms to algorithm implementations should be modular allowing new algorithms to
be readily inserted. That is, implementers should be prepared to be readily inserted. That is, implementers should be prepared to
regularly update the set of algorithms in their implementations.</t> -- > regularly update the set of algorithms in their implementations.</t> -- >
</section> </section>
</middle>
<back>
<section title="Acknowledgements" anchor="ack"> <displayreference target="I-D.ietf-lamps-pkix-shake" to="PKIX-SHAKE"/>
<t>This document is based on Russ Housley's draft <displayreference target="I-D.housley-lamps-cms-sha3-hash" to="CMS-SHA3"/>
<xref target="I-D.housley-lamps-cms-sha3-hash"/>.
It replaces SHA3 hash functions by SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 as the LAMPS
WG agreed.</t>
<t>The authors would like to thank Russ Housley for his guidance and
very valuable contributions with the ASN.1 module. Valuable
feedback was also provided by Eric Rescorla. </t>
</section>
</middle>
<back> <references>
<references title="Normative References"> <name>References</name>
&RFC2119;
&RFC3370; <!--[rfced] We had the following questions about the References section.
&RFC8174;
&RFC5652; a) The URL in this reference entry notes that that register was
&RFC8017; <!-- RFC8017 is Informational draft but we are keeping it in updated in "October 2019". May we update this reference entry accordingly?
the Normative References even though idnits complains because we need a normativ
e reference for RSASSA-PSS. RFC4056 does the same thing with RSASS-PSS v2.1 --> Original:
&RFC4055; [shake-nist-oids]
&RFC5480; National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Computer
<reference anchor="SHA3"> Security Objects Register", October 2017,
<front> <https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Computer-Security-Objects-
<title>SHA-3 Standard - Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Outpu Register/Algorithm-Registration>.
t Functions</title>
<author> Perhaps:
<organization>National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S [shake-nist-oids]
. Department of Commerce</organization> National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Computer
</author> Security Objects Register", October 2019,
<date month="August" year="2015"/> <https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Computer-Security-Objects-
</front> Register/Algorithm-Registration>.
<seriesInfo name="FIPS" value="PUB 202"/>
</reference> b) We note that a new version of this document exists (see
<reference anchor="SP800-185" target="http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Spe https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-78-4.pdf).
cialPublications/NIST.SP.800-185.pdf"> Would you like to reference the most current version?
<front>
<title>SHA-3 Derived Functions: cSHAKE, KMAC, TupleHash and ParallelHa Original:
sh. NIST SP 800-185</title> [SP800-78-4]
<author> National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
<organization>National Institute of Standards and Technology</organi "SP800-78-4: Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes for
zation> Personal Identity Verification", May 2014,
</author> <https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/publications/sp/800-
<date month="December" year="2016" /> 78/4/final/documents/sp800_78-4_revised_draft.pdf>.
</front>
</reference> Perhaps:
<!-- <reference anchor="ASN1-B"><front> [SP800-78-4]
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
"Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes for
Personal Identity Verification", NIST Special Publication
800-78-4, DOI 10.6028/NIST.SP.800-78-4, May 2015,
<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-
78-4.pdf>
c) This reference has been superseded by a new version (see
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-107r1.pdf)
.
Would you like to reference the most current version? Note that the URL in the
original has a publication date of September 2011 (not May 2014).
Original:
[SP800-107]
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
"SP800-107: Recommendation for Applications Using Approved
Hash Algorithms", May 2014,
<https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/publications/sp/800-107/
rev-1/final/documents/draft_revised_sp800-107.pdf>.
Perhaps:
[SP800-107]
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
"Recommendation for Applications Using Approved
Hash Algorithms", NIST Special Publication 800-107 Revision 1,
DOI 10.6026/NIST.SP.800-107r1, August 2012,
<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/
nistspecialpublication800-107r1.pdf>.
-->
<references>
<name>Normative References</name>
<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.tools.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/refer
ence.RFC.2119.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.tools.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/refer
ence.RFC.3370.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.tools.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/refer
ence.RFC.8174.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.tools.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/refer
ence.RFC.5652.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.tools.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/refer
ence.RFC.8017.xml"/>
<!-- RFC8017 is Informational draft but we are keeping it in the Normati
ve References even though idnits complains because we need a normative reference
for RSASSA-PSS. RFC4056 does the same thing with RSASS-PSS v2.1 -->
<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.tools.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/refer
ence.RFC.4055.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.tools.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/refer
ence.RFC.5480.xml"/>
<reference anchor="SHA3" target="https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIP
S.202.pdf">
<front>
<title>SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output
Functions</title>
<author>
<organization>National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST)</organization>
</author>
<date month="August" year="2015"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="FIPS" value="PUB 202"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.6028/NIST.FIPS.202"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="SP800-185" target="http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Spec
ialPublications/NIST.SP.800-185.pdf">
<front>
<title>SHA-3 Derived Functions: cSHAKE, KMAC, TupleHash and Parallel
Hash</title>
<author>
<organization>National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST
)</organization>
</author>
<date month="December" year="2016"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="NIST Special Publication" value="800-185"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.6028/NIST.SP.800-185"/>
</reference>
<!-- <reference anchor="ASN1-B"><front>
<title>Information technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): S pecification of basic notation</title> <title>Information technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): S pecification of basic notation</title>
<author> <author>
<organization>ITU-T</organization> <organization>ITU-T</organization>
</author> </author>
<date year="2015"/> <date year="2015"/>
</front> </front>
<seriesInfo name="ITU-T" value="Recommendation X.680"/> <seriesInfo name="ITU-T" value="Recommendation X.680"/>
</reference> --> </reference> -->
<!-- <reference anchor="ASN1-E"><front> <!-- <reference anchor="ASN1-E"><front>
<title>Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Enc oding Rules (DER)</title> <title>Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Enc oding Rules (DER)</title>
<author> <author>
<organization>ITU-T</organization> <organization>ITU-T</organization>
</author> </author>
<date year="2015"/> <date year="2015"/>
</front> </front>
<seriesInfo name="ITU-T" value="Recommendation X.690"/> <seriesInfo name="ITU-T" value="Recommendation X.690"/>
</reference> --> </reference> -->
<!-- <reference anchor="DSS"><front> <!-- <reference anchor="DSS"><front>
<title>Digital Signature Standard, version 4</title> <title>Digital Signature Standard, version 4</title>
<author> <author>
<organization>National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S. Depa rtment of Commerce</organization> <organization>National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S. Depa rtment of Commerce</organization>
</author> </author>
<date year="2013"/> <date year="2013"/>
</front> </front>
<seriesInfo name="NIST" value="FIPS PUB 186-4"/> <seriesInfo name="NIST" value="FIPS PUB 186-4"/>
</reference> --> </reference> -->
</references> </references>
<references>
<name>Informative References</name>
<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.tools.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/refer
ence.RFC.3279.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.tools.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/refer
ence.RFC.5753.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.tools.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/refer
ence.RFC.5911.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.tools.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/refer
ence.RFC.6268.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.tools.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/refer
ence.RFC.6979.xml"/>
<references title="Informative References"> <!-- ietf-lamps-pkix-shake RFC-EDITOR State -->
&RFC3279; <xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.tools.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/refe
<!-- &RFC4086; --> rence.I-D.ietf-lamps-pkix-shake.xml"/>
&RFC5753;
&RFC5911; <!-- housley-lamps-cms-sha3-hash Expired -->
&RFC6268; <xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.tools.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/refe
&RFC6979; rence.I-D.housley-lamps-cms-sha3-hash.xml"/>
&I-D.ietf-lamps-pkix-shake;
<?rfc include="http://xml2rfc.tools.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml-ids/refe <reference anchor="shake-nist-oids" target="https://csrc.nist.gov/Projec
rence.I-D.draft-housley-lamps-cms-sha3-hash-00.xml"?> ts/Computer-Security-Objects-Register/Algorithm-Registration">
<reference anchor="shake-nist-oids" target="https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects <front>
/Computer-Security-Objects-Register/Algorithm-Registration"> <title>Computer Security Objects Register</title>
<front> <author>
<title>Computer Security Objects Register</title> <organization>National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST
<author> )</organization>
<organization>National Institute of Standards and Technology</organi </author>
zation> <date month="October" year="2017"/>
</author> </front>
<date month="October" year="2017" /> </reference>
</front>
</reference> <reference anchor="X9.62">
<reference anchor="X9.62"> <front>
<front> <title>Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry:
<title>X9.62-2005 Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services I the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)</title>
ndustry: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Standard (ECDSA)</title> <author>
<author> <organization>American National Standard for Financial Services (A
<organization>American National Standard for Financial Services (ANS NSI)</organization>
I)</organization> </author>
</author> <date month="November" year="2005"/>
<date month="November" year="2005" /> </front>
</front> <seriesInfo name="ANSI" value="X9.62"/>
</reference> </reference>
<reference anchor="SP800-78-4" target="https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/pu
blications/sp/800-78/4/final/documents/sp800_78-4_revised_draft.pdf"> <reference anchor="SP800-78-4" target="https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/
<front> publications/sp/800-78/4/final/documents/sp800_78-4_revised_draft.pdf">
<title>SP800-78-4: Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes for Personal <front>
Identity Verification</title> <title>Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes for Personal Identity
<author> Verification</title>
<organization>National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)< <author>
/organization> <organization>National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST
</author> )</organization>
<date month="May" year="2014" /> </author>
</front> <date month="May" year="2014"/>
</reference> </front>
<reference anchor="SP800-107" target="https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/pub <seriesInfo name="NIST Special Publication" value="800-78-4"/>
lications/sp/800-107/rev-1/final/documents/draft_revised_sp800-107.pdf"> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.6028/NIST.SP.800-78-4"/>
<front> </reference>
<title>SP800-107: Recommendation for Applications Using Approved Hash
Algorithms</title> <reference anchor="SP800-107" target="https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/p
<author> ublications/sp/800-107/rev-1/final/documents/draft_revised_sp800-107.pdf">
<organization>National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)< <front>
/organization> <title>Recommendation for Applications Using Approved Hash Algorithm
</author> s</title>
<date month="May" year="2014" /> <author>
</front> <organization>National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST
</reference> )</organization>
<reference anchor="SEC1" target="http://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf"> </author>
<front> <date month="May" year="2014"/>
<title>SEC 1: Elliptic Curve Cryptography</title> </front>
<author> <seriesInfo name="Draft NIST Special Publication"
<organization>Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group</organizati value="800-107 Revised"/>
on> </reference>
</author>
<date month="May" year="2009" /> <reference anchor="SEC1" target="http://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf">
</front> <front>
</reference> <title>SEC 1: Elliptic Curve Cryptography</title>
<!-- <reference anchor="SMI-PKIX" target="https://www.iana.org/assignments <author>
/smi-numbers/smi-numbers.xhtml#smi-numbers-1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6"> <organization>Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group</organiza
tion>
</author>
<date month="May" year="2009"/>
</front>
</reference>
<!-- <reference anchor="SMI-PKIX" target="https://www.iana.org/assignmen
ts/smi-numbers/smi-numbers.xhtml#smi-numbers-1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6">
<front> <front>
<title>SMI Security for PKIX Algorithms</title> <title>SMI Security for PKIX Algorithms</title>
<author> <author>
<organization>IANA</organization> <organization>IANA</organization>
</author> </author>
<date month="March" year="2019" /> <date month="March" year="2019" />
</front> </front>
</reference> --> </reference> -->
<!-- <reference anchor="SP800-90A" target="http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpub s/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-90Ar1.pdf"> <!-- <reference anchor="SP800-90A" target="http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistp ubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-90Ar1.pdf">
<front> <front>
<title>Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators. NIST SP 800-90A</title> <title>Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators. NIST SP 800-90A</title>
<author> <author>
<organization>National Institute of Standards and Technology</organi zation> <organization>National Institute of Standards and Technology</organi zation>
</author> </author>
<date month="June" year="2015" /> <date month="June" year="2015" />
</front> </front>
</reference> --> </reference> -->
</references> </references>
<section title="ASN.1 Module" anchor="section-a"> </references>
<t>This appendix includes the ASN.1 modules for SHAKEs in CMS. <section anchor="asn-app" numbered="true" toc="default">
<name>ASN.1 Module</name>
<t>This appendix includes the ASN.1 modules for SHAKEs in CMS.
This module includes some ASN.1 from other standards for reference.</t> This module includes some ASN.1 from other standards for reference.</t>
<t><figure><artwork><![CDATA[ <sourcecode type="asn.1"><![CDATA[
CMSAlgsForSHAKE-2019 { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) CMSAlgsForSHAKE-2019 { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0)
id-mod-cms-shakes-2019(70) } id-mod-cms-shakes-2019(70) }
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN BEGIN
-- EXPORTS ALL; -- EXPORTS ALL;
IMPORTS IMPORTS
DIGEST-ALGORITHM, MAC-ALGORITHM, SMIME-CAPS DIGEST-ALGORITHM, MAC-ALGORITHM, SMIME-CAPS
FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009 FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58) } id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58) }
RSAPublicKey, rsaEncryption, id-ecPublicKey RSAPublicKey, rsaEncryption, id-ecPublicKey
FROM PKIXAlgs-2009 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) FROM PKIXAlgs-2009 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-pkix1-algorithms2008-02(56) } id-mod-pkix1-algorithms2008-02(56) }
sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE128, sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE256, sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE128, sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE256,
sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE128, sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE256 sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE128, sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE256
FROM PKIXAlgsForSHAKE-2019 { FROM PKIXAlgsForSHAKE-2019 {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-pkix1-shakes-2019(94) } ; id-mod-pkix1-shakes-2019(94) } ;
-- Message Digest Algorithms (mda-) -- Message Digest Algorithms (mda-)
-- used in SignedData, SignerInfo, DigestedData, -- used in SignedData, SignerInfo, DigestedData,
-- and the AuthenticatedData digestAlgorithm -- and the AuthenticatedData digestAlgorithm
-- fields in CMS -- fields in CMS
-- --
-- This expands MessageAuthAlgs from [RFC5652] and -- This expands MessageAuthAlgs from [RFC5652] and
-- MessageDigestAlgs in [RFC5753] -- MessageDigestAlgs in [RFC5753]
-- --
-- MessageDigestAlgs DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= { -- MessageDigestAlgs DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {
-- mda-shake128 | -- mda-shake128 |
-- mda-shake256, -- mda-shake256,
-- ... -- ...
-- } -- }
- } --
-- -- One-Way Hash Functions
-- One-Way Hash Functions -- SHAKE128
-- SHAKE128 mda-shake128 DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {
mda-shake128 DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= { IDENTIFIER id-shake128 -- with output length 32 bytes.
IDENTIFIER id-shake128 -- with output length 32 bytes. }
} id-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
id-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)
csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) hashAlgs(2) 11 }
hashAlgs(2) 11 }
-- SHAKE256 -- SHAKE256
mda-shake256 DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= { mda-shake256 DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-shake256 -- with output length 64 bytes. IDENTIFIER id-shake256 -- with output length 64 bytes.
} }
id-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) id-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101) us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)
hashAlgs(2) 12 } hashAlgs(2) 12 }
-- --
-- Public key algorithm identifiers located in the -- Public key algorithm identifiers located in the
-- OriginatorPublicKey's algorithm attribute in CMS. -- OriginatorPublicKey's algorithm attribute in CMS.
-- And Signature identifiers used in SignerInfo -- And Signature identifiers used in SignerInfo
-- signatureAlgorithm field of SignedData content -- signatureAlgorithm field of SignedData content
-- type and countersignature attribute in CMS. -- type and countersignature attribute in CMS.
-- --
-- From RFC5280, for reference. -- From RFC 5280, for reference:
-- rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 1 } -- rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 1 }
-- When the rsaEncryption algorithm identifier is used -- When the rsaEncryption algorithm identifier is used
-- for a public key, the AlgorithmIdentifier parameters -- for a public key, the AlgorithmIdentifier parameters
-- field MUST contain NULL. -- field MUST contain NULL.
-- --
id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) 30 } security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) 30 }
id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) 31 } security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) 31 }
-- When the id-RSASSA-PSS-* algorithm identifiers are used -- When the id-RSASSA-PSS-* algorithm identifiers are used
-- for a public key or signature in CMS, the AlgorithmIdentifier -- for a public key or signature in CMS, the AlgorithmIdentifier
-- parameters field MUST be absent. The message digest algorithm -- parameters field MUST be absent. The message digest algorithm
-- used in RSASSA-PSS MUST be SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 with a 32 or -- used in RSASSA-PSS MUST be SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 with a 32- or
-- 64 byte outout length, respectively. The mask generation -- 64-byte output length, respectively. The mask generation
-- function MUST be SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 with an output length -- function MUST be SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 with an output length
-- of (8*ceil((n-1)/8) - 264) or (8*ceil((n-1)/8) - 520) bits, -- of (8*ceil((n-1)/8) - 264) or (8*ceil((n-1)/8) - 520) bits,
-- respectively, where n is the RSA modulus in bits. -- respectively, where n is the RSA modulus in bits.
-- The RSASSA-PSS saltLength MUST be 32 or 64 bytes, respectively. -- The RSASSA-PSS saltLength MUST be 32 or 64 bytes, respectively.
-- The trailerField MUST be 1, which represents the trailer -- The trailerField MUST be 1, which represents the trailer
-- field with hexadecimal value 0xBC. Regardless of -- field with hexadecimal value 0xBC. Regardless of
-- id-RSASSA-PSS-* or rsaEncryption being used as the -- id-RSASSA-PSS-* or rsaEncryption being used as the
-- AlgorithmIdentifier of the OriginatorPublicKey, the RSA -- AlgorithmIdentifier of the OriginatorPublicKey, the RSA
-- public key MUST be encoded using the RSAPublicKey type. -- public key MUST be encoded using the RSAPublicKey type.
-- From RFC4055, for reference. -- From RFC 4055, for reference:
-- RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE { -- RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE {
-- modulus INTEGER, -- -- n -- modulus INTEGER, -- -- n
-- publicExponent INTEGER } -- -- e -- publicExponent INTEGER } -- -- e
- publicExponent INTEGER } -- -- e id-ecdsa-with-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
id-ecdsa-with-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) 32 }
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) 32 }
id-ecdsa-with-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) id-ecdsa-with-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) 33 } security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) 33 }
-- When the id-ecdsa-with-shake* algorithm identifiers are -- When the id-ecdsa-with-shake* algorithm identifiers are
-- used in CMS, the AlgorithmIdentifier parameters field -- used in CMS, the AlgorithmIdentifier parameters field
-- MUST be absent and the signature algorithm should be -- MUST be absent and the signature algorithm should be
-- deterministic ECDSA [RFC6979]. The message digest MUST -- deterministic ECDSA [RFC6979]. The message digest MUST
-- be SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 with a 32 or 64 byte outout -- be SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 with a 32- or 64-byte output
-- length, respectively. In both cases, the ECDSA public key, -- length, respectively. In both cases, the ECDSA public key,
-- MUST be encoded using the id-ecPublicKey type. -- MUST be encoded using the id-ecPublicKey type.
-- From RFC5480, for reference. -- From RFC 5480, for reference:
-- id-ecPublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { -- id-ecPublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
-- iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) keyType(2) 1 } -- iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) keyType(2) 1 }
-- The id-ecPublicKey parameters must be absent or present -- The id-ecPublicKey parameters must be absent or present
-- and are defined as -- and are defined as:
-- ECParameters ::= CHOICE { -- ECParameters ::= CHOICE {
-- namedCurve OBJECT IDENTIFIER -- namedCurve OBJECT IDENTIFIER
-- -- -- implicitCurve NULL -- -- -- implicitCurve NULL
-- -- -- specifiedCurve SpecifiedECDomain -- -- -- specifiedCurve SpecifiedECDomain
-- } -- }
- } -- This expands SignatureAlgorithms from [RFC5912]
-- This expands SignatureAlgorithms from [RFC5912] --
-- -- SignatureAlgs SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
-- SignatureAlgs SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= { -- sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE128 |
-- sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE128 | -- sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE256 |
-- sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE256 | -- sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE128 |
-- sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE128 | -- sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE256,
-- sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE256, -- ...
-- ... -- }
-- }
- } -- This expands MessageAuthAlgs from [RFC5652] and [RFC6268]
-- This expands MessageAuthAlgs from [RFC5652] and [RFC6268] --
-- -- Message Authentication (maca-) Algorithms
-- Message Authentication (maca-) Algorithms -- used in AuthenticatedData macAlgorithm in CMS
-- used in AuthenticatedData macAlgorithm in CMS --
-- MessageAuthAlgs MAC-ALGORITHM ::= {
MessageAuthAlgs MAC-ALGORITHM ::= { maca-KMACwithSHAKE128 |
maca-KMACwithSHAKE128 | maca-KMACwithSHAKE256,
maca-KMACwithSHAKE256, ...
... }
}
-- This expands SMimeCaps from [RFC5911] -- This expands SMimeCaps from [RFC5911]
-- --
SMimeCaps SMIME-CAPS ::= { SMimeCaps SMIME-CAPS ::= {
-- sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE128.&smimeCaps | -- sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE128.&smimeCaps |
-- sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE256.&smimeCaps | -- sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE256.&smimeCaps |
-- sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE128.&smimeCaps | -- sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE128.&smimeCaps |
-- sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE256.&smimeCaps, -- sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE256.&smimeCaps,
maca-KMACwithSHAKE128.&smimeCaps | maca-KMACwithSHAKE128.&smimeCaps |
maca-KMACwithSHAKE256.&smimeCaps, maca-KMACwithSHAKE256.&smimeCaps,
... ...
} }
-- --
-- KMAC with SHAKE128 -- KMAC with SHAKE128
maca-KMACwithSHAKE128 MAC-ALGORITHM ::= { maca-KMACwithSHAKE128 MAC-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-KMACWithSHAKE128 IDENTIFIER id-KMACWithSHAKE128
PARAMS TYPE KMACwithSHAKE128-params ARE optional PARAMS TYPE KMACwithSHAKE128-params ARE optional
-- If KMACwithSHAKE128-params parameters are absent -- If KMACwithSHAKE128-params parameters are absent,
-- the SHAKE128 output length used in KMAC is 256 bits -- the SHAKE128 output length used in KMAC is 256 bits
-- and the customization string is an empty string. -- and the customization string is an empty string.
IS-KEYED-MAC TRUE IS-KEYED-MAC TRUE
SMIME-CAPS {IDENTIFIED BY id-KMACWithSHAKE128} SMIME-CAPS {IDENTIFIED BY id-KMACWithSHAKE128}
} }
id-KMACWithSHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) id-KMACWithSHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) country(16) us(840) organization(1)
gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)
hashAlgs(2) 19 } hashAlgs(2) 19 }
KMACwithSHAKE128-params ::= SEQUENCE { KMACwithSHAKE128-params ::= SEQUENCE {
kMACOutputLength INTEGER DEFAULT 256, -- Output length in bits kMACOutputLength INTEGER DEFAULT 256, -- Output length in bits
customizationString OCTET STRING DEFAULT ''H customizationString OCTET STRING DEFAULT ''H
} }
-- KMAC with SHAKE256 -- KMAC with SHAKE256
maca-KMACwithSHAKE256 MAC-ALGORITHM ::= { maca-KMACwithSHAKE256 MAC-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-KMACWithSHAKE256 IDENTIFIER id-KMACWithSHAKE256
PARAMS TYPE KMACwithSHAKE256-params ARE optional PARAMS TYPE KMACwithSHAKE256-params ARE optional
-- If KMACwithSHAKE256-params parameters are absent -- If KMACwithSHAKE256-params parameters are absent,
-- the SHAKE256 output length used in KMAC is 512 bits -- the SHAKE256 output length used in KMAC is 512 bits
-- and the customization string is an empty string. -- and the customization string is an empty string.
IS-KEYED-MAC TRUE IS-KEYED-MAC TRUE
SMIME-CAPS {IDENTIFIED BY id-KMACWithSHAKE256} SMIME-CAPS {IDENTIFIED BY id-KMACWithSHAKE256}
} }
id-KMACWithSHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) id-KMACWithSHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) country(16) us(840) organization(1)
gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)
hashAlgs(2) 20 } hashAlgs(2) 20 }
KMACwithSHAKE256-params ::= SEQUENCE { KMACwithSHAKE256-params ::= SEQUENCE {
kMACOutputLength INTEGER DEFAULT 512, -- Output length in bits kMACOutputLength INTEGER DEFAULT 512, -- Output length in bits
customizationString OCTET STRING DEFAULT ''H customizationString OCTET STRING DEFAULT ''H
} }
END END ]]></sourcecode>
]]></artwork></figure> </section>
</t> <section anchor="ack" numbered="false" toc="default">
</section> <name>Acknowledgements</name>
<t>This document is based on Russ Housley's document
<xref target="I-D.housley-lamps-cms-sha3-hash" format="default"/>.
It replaces SHA3 hash functions by SHAKE128 and SHAKE256, as the LAMPS
WG agreed.</t>
<t>The authors would like to thank Russ Housley for his guidance and
very valuable contributions with the ASN.1 module. Valuable
feedback was also provided by Eric Rescorla. </t>
</section>
</back> <!-- [rfced] Terminology
a) Throughout the text, the following terminology appears to be used
inconsistently. Please review these occurrences and let us know if/how they
may be made consistent.
message digest vs. Message Digest
signatureAlgorithm vs. SignatureAlgorithm
signed-data content type vs. SignedData content type
mac vs. MAC
-->
</back>
</rfc> </rfc>
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